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Abstract:  Assuming an animal to be sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an 
extreme position, hence it should not and could not be the default assumption. Birch explains how the 
precautionary principle may be used to substantiate decisions to give the animal the benefit of doubt. 
Although I am reluctant to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument for the use of 
the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more research is needed to 
refine and understand this relationship. 
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Birch (2017) posits the quantity and quality of data needed to convince us that an organism is 
sentient. He distinguishes between a broad sense of sentience that considers organisms’ 
subjective experiences of the world and a narrower one that focuses on subjective experiences 
with an attractive or aversive quality (e.g., pain, suffering, pleasure, joy, etc.). He argues that the 
narrower meaning is what is used in animal welfare science and animal ethics. Although the 
precautionary principle was originally used to direct environmental policy and later public health, 
he proposes an Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) that would prevent “serious, 
negative animal welfare outcomes.” Birch employs two rules provided by John (2011) for 
precautionary principles. First, the epistemic rule is that if scientific data suggest a causal 
relationship of sentience, one should set an intentionally low evidential bar. Second, the decision 
rule is that once such evidence is demonstrated, we should proceed in a timely and cost-effective 
manner to implement actions that prevent aversive outcomes. To assume that an animal is 
sentient in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary is an extreme position, hence it 
should not and could not be the default assumption. 
 Birch’s two proposals — the first for the epistemic rule (BAR), and the second for the 
decision rule (ACT), are the following: 
 
BAR — For the purposes of formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient 
evidence that animals of a particular order are sentient if there is statistically significant 
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evidence, obtained by experiments that meet normal scientific standards, of the presence 
of at least one credible indicator of sentience in at least one species of that order. 
 
ACT — We should aim to include within the scope of animal protection legislation all 
animals for which the evidence of sentience is sufficient, according to the standard of 
sufficiency outlined in BAR. 
 
Birch gives examples of classes (e.g., Cephalopoda, Malacostraca) and several orders (e.g., 
Salmoniformes, Gadiformes, Cypriniformes) to support the use of orders rather than some other 
level in the Linnaean hierarchy. These arguments cannot be justified. I regard species as 
ontological individuals (sensu Ghiselin 1997). Since levels above the species (e.g., genus, family, 
order, class) began with a single speciation event, these higher levels are also ontological 
individuals. There are no guidelines, however, for grouping species into genera, genera into 
families, families into orders, etc. As long as each level is composed of a monophyletic 
assemblage, it is valid under the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature. For example, 
Mayden (1989) elevated a subgenus of Notropis, i.e., Cyprinella, to genus level. The division of the 
ranks above the species level is governed in part by our knowledge of the diversity of the groups. 
Perhaps Birch should consider the size of selected groups rather than choosing a specific 
phylogenetic level.  
 I applaud Birch’s arguments that there must be “credible indicators of sentience.” I 
disagree with the examples cited from the literature and provided by him as methods to 
determine these indicators. For example, an animal learns to administer pain-relief drugs (i.e., 
opioids) is taken as evidence of sentience. Perhaps, as in humans, it is sometimes just an example 
of addiction. Furthermore, Birch’s argument about motivational tradeoffs is weak. He assumes 
that if an animal avoids a stimulus, it was noxious and the avoidance indicates pain. I have 
conducted numerous studies on temperature preference and avoidance in fishes (e.g., Stauffer 
et al. 1974, 1976, 1980). Fishes will prefer certain temperatures and avoid others based on their 
acclimation temperatures. These preferred temperatures differ based on sex and age (Stauffer et 
al. 1985). Reynolds et al. (1976, 1978, 1980) demonstrated that pathogens of poikilotherms 
exhibit a behavioral febrile response and thus result in a higher preferred temperature. These 
behaviors were interpreted as a result of natural selection, not sentience. 
 Despite my reluctance to accept all of his points, Birch has provided an excellent argument 
for the use of the precautionary principle for the detection of animal sentience. I agree that more 
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